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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
that the state court in the instant case had particularized the
interest of the state to an extent which was not present in the
Sweezy decision. It also seems to appear that the Court may be
developing a distinction between the right of anonymous political
association as presented in the instant case and the other First
Amendment freedoms, such as those of political association and
academic freedom as found in the Sweezy decision. Apparently,
these latter freedoms will be given somewhat more protection
from invasion than the former. 19 It is to be noted that the Court
in the instant case did not treat the matter of procedural due
process. This may be accounted for by the fact that the Court
had before it a determination by the highest state court as to the
state legislature's desire for the information sought, a circum-
stance not present in the Sweezy case. However, it is to be
remembered that the Court has repeatedly stated that each due
process case will largely turn on the facts there presented.20 For
this reason it is not felt that the instant case necessarily stands
for the proposition that procedural due process will not be in-
quired into in future cases of like nature.
Robert S. Cooper, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW - STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL STATUTES
Defendant was convicted of public intimidation of an officer
for a battery committed while he was an inmate at the state peni-
tentiary. The basis of the conviction was the fact that he had
struck a prison guard who seized his arm when he ignored a re-
19. Compare Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958) ; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), with Barren-
blatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) and Wyman v. Uphaus, 360 U.S. 72
(1959).
20. E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Cf.
Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959), where the Supreme Court reversed a con-
viction of contempt when petitioner refused to answer questions propounded by a
Virginia state legislative committee authorized to investigate: (1) tax structure
of racial organizations, (2) the effect of integration or its threat on public schools
of Virginia and the state's general welfare, and (3) violation of statutes on
champerty, barratry, and maintenance or unauthorized practice of law. The 'basis
of the decision was that the petitioner was not informed of the pertinency of the
questions asked and whether or not any of them fell into one of the three areas
authorized for investigation. As a result, any conviction for refusal to answer
under these circumstances would result in a denial of procedural due process of
law under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court cited NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958), and said that this was an imposition on a troubled area of speech,
press, and association in an area of great public interest. Four members of the
Court reiterated their position announced in the Sweezy case that they could not
at this time think of any circumstances which would be sufficient to permit an
invasion by the states into these areas of constitutionally protected rights.
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quest to go to the end of a meal line. On appeal to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, on rehearing, held, conviction reversed.' Under
an application of the maxim of strict construction of penal stat-
utes it is clear the defendant's act was not for the purpose of in-
fluencing an officer in relation to his position 2 but was merely a
spontaneous act of mild violence caused by defendant's resent-
ment, and therefore did not amount to public intimidation. State
v. Daniels, 236 La. 998, 109 So.2d 896 (1959).
Louisiana has long recognized the common law maxim of
strict construction of penal statutes.3 Strict construction really
means that close questions as to the coverage of a criminal stat-
ute are to be resolved in favor of the accused. 4 Some of the rea-
sons given for this maxim are: (1) The power of punishment is
vested in the legislature rather than the judiciary; this legisla-
tive power guards against creation of crimes not contemplated by
the legislature by judicial construction. 5 (2) Since the state
makes the laws, these laws should be construed against the state
in case of ambiguity or doubt.6 (3) In order that people of ordi-
nary understanding may be given notice of what conduct is pro-
scribed as criminal, penal statutes will not be construed to include
anything beyond the clear meaning of the words employed.T
Criminal statutes are also subject to the general rule of statutory
interpretation that the intention of the legislature should be ob-
1. On original hearing the Supreme Court did not discuss the maxim of strict
construction of criminal statutes, holding that the crime of public intimidation
requires a specific intent to influence the conduct in relation to his position, em-
ployment, or duty of any public officer, grand juror, witness, or voter, which intent
was not present in this case.
2. "The resentment of the defendant displayed itself in a spontaneous act of
mild violence and nothing more. It does not contain any showing that the resent-
ment and mild violence were for the purpose of influencing the conduct of the
officer in relation to his position, employment, or duty." State v. Daniels, 236
La. 998, 1025, 109 So.2d 896, 905 (1959).
3. See, e.g., State v. Viator, 229 La. 882, 87 So.2d 115 (1956) ; State v. Sloan,
139 La. 881, 72 So.2d 428 (1916) ; State v. Palanque, 133 La. 36, 62 So. 224
(1913) ; State v. Peters, 37 La. Ann. 730 (1885) ; State v. King, 12 La. Ann. 593
(1857).
4. See, e.g., State v. Viator, 229 La. 882, 87 So.2d 115 (1956) ; State v. Brun-
son, 162 La. 902, 111 So. 321 (1927) ; Lane v. State, 120 Neb. 302, 305, 232 N.W.
96, 98 (1930) ; Caldwell v. State, 115 Ohio St. 458, 461, 154 N.E. 792, 793 (1926).
5. See United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) ; Simms
v. Bean, 10 La. Ann. 346 (1855) ; State v. Lowery, 166 Ind. 372, 77 N.E. 728
(1905) ; Woodruff v. State, 68 N.J.L. 89, 52 Atl. 294 (1902). See also 3 SUTHnE-
LAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 54, § 5605 (1943).
6. This evidently is an analogy to contract law. See Wade, Acquisition of Prop-
erty by Wilfully Killing Another -A Statutory Solution, 48 H-,Av. L. REv. 748,
750 (1935).
7. See State v. Hebert, 179 La. 190, 153 So. 688 (1934) ; State v. Terrill, 169
La. 144, 124 So. 673 (1929) ; People v. Koch, 250 App. Div. 623, 294 N.Y. Supp.
987 (1937). See also 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
54, § 5605 (1943).
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served." Thus, conduct may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute because it is not within its spirit, nor
within the activities sought to be covered by the legislature.9 Con-
versely, applying the maxim that the true legislative intent shall
be sought, courts have held that a literal construction should not
be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute.10 To-
day the legislatures of many states have abrogated or modified
the rule of strict interpretation of criminal statutes." The sub-
stitution of a more liberal rule of construction first appeared in
specific types of statutes,'12 but some modern penal codes have
adopted blanket or general provisions calling for a liberal or at
least a fair and genuine construction.'8 These codes generally
state that the common law rule of strict interpretation of penal
statutes is no longer applicable, and substitute in its place some
statement of genuine interpretation.
At the time of the adoption of the Louisiana Criminal Code
in 1942, one of the code draftsmen strongly urged that the rule
of strict interpretation be expressly abolished. 4 The rule of
strict interpretation was not expressly abolished, but a rule of
genuine construction was adopted by Article 3, which provides
that "the articles of this code cannot be extended by analogy so
as to create crimes not provided for herein; however, in order
to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its
provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to
8. See, e.g., State v. Penniman, 224 La. 95, 68 So.2d 770 (1953) ; State v.
Broussard, 213 La. 338, 34 So.2d 883 (1948) ; State v. Cook, 203 La. 95, 13 So.2d
478 (1943).
9. See Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). This
case involved a federal statute prohibiting the importation and migration of for-
eigners and aliens under contract or agreement to perform labor in the United
States. The Court held that the statute did not apply to a contract between an
alien and a church in this country where the alien was to serve as minister of
the church.
10. See, e.g., State v. Broussard, 213 La. 338, 34 So.2d 883 (1948) ; State v.
Davis, 208 La. 954, 23 So.2d 801 (1945) ; State v. Cook, 203 La. 95, 13 So.2d
478 (1943).
11. E.g., ARIZ. REV. CODE ANN. § 4477 (1928); CALIF. PENAL CODE § 4
(1933) ; N.Y. Penal Law § 21 (1909). See 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCTION 59, § 5606 (1943)..
12. E.g., Tenn. Acts, c. 5, § 5 (1824) ; Va. Acts, c. 35, § 9 (1802). See 3
SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 58, § 5606 (1943).
13. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. C. 131, § 1 (1933) ; MINN. STAT. § 9908 (1927).
See 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 60, § 5606 (1943).
14. Professor Morrow urged that the rule of strict interpretation should be dis-
credited on historical, theoretical, and practical grounds. He pointed out that
every state which had reconsidered the problem legislatively had repudiated the
common law rule. He also argued that the civil law had done away with the dis-
tinction between narrow and liberal interpretation. See Morrow, The Louisiana
Criminal Code of 1942- Opportunities Lost and Challenges Yet Unanswered, 17
TUL. L. REv. 4 (1942).
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the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in con-
nection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the
provision."'15 This article is based upon the work of Edward Liv-
ingston,' and represents a substantial restatement of the rules
of interpretation for which he contended and which he placed in
Article 4 of his proposed penal code of 1825. Livingston, how-
ever, did not favor a liberal interpretation of penal statutes; he
favored a logical and genuine interpretation. He felt that the
first constructive extension of a penal statute beyond its letter
was an ex post facto law, as regards the offense to which it is
applied, and is an illegal assumption of legislative power.' 7 Al-
though it has been argued that Article 3 of the present Criminal
Code permits liberal construction of criminal statutes,'8 subse-
quent cases have generally adhered to a strict construction. 9 In
State v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.,20 a case involving a viola-
tion of the common purchaser law, the court held that criminal
statutes in Louisiana are subject to strict interpretation, and said
that this rule of construction is well settled. In State v. Viator2 '
the court, in holding that beer was excluded from a statute pro-
hibiting the sale of alcoholic liquor to persons under twenty-one,
stated that "penal statutes are to be strictly construed and can-
not be extended to cases not included within the clear import of
their language. Where any doubt exists as to the interpretation
upon which a prosecution is based, such doubt must be resolved
in favor of the accused."
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:122 provides that "Public In-
timidation is the use of violence, force, or threats upon any of
the following persons, with the intent to influence his conduct in
relation to his position, employment, or duty: (1) public officer
15. Now IA. R.S. 14:3 (1950).
16. LIVINGSTON, REPORT ON LOUISIANA PENAL CODE 135 (1822).
17. Id. at 22.
18. After the Code was adopted, Professor Morrow argued that under the
language of Article 3, the Criminal Code offenses could be liberally construed. He
has stated: "It seems obvious that the court cannot give the Code's provisions a
genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their
usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the provision,
and yet indulge in strict interpretation." He also stated that most of those who
had anything to do with the project, while they feared an express repudiation of
the common law rule on policy grounds, nevertheless favored its suppression in
some form. See Morrow, The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942 - Opportunities
Lost and Challenges Yet Unanswered, 17 TUL. L. REV. 11 (1.942).
19. See, e.g., State v. Viator, 229 La. 882, 87 So.2d 115 (1956); State v.
Arkansas La. Gas Co., 227 La. 179, 78 So.2d 825 (1955) ; State v. Tanner, 226
La. 278, 76 So.2d 5 (1954) ; State v. Mack, 224 La. 886, 71 So.2d 315 (1954)
State v. Penniman, 224 La. 95, 68 So.2d 770 (1953).
20. 227 La. 179, 78 So.2d 825 (1955).
21. 229 La. 882, 87 So.2d 115 (1956).
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or employee, (2) witness, (3) juror . . . ." Cases prior to the
instant case involved the clearly covered situations of jurors and
witnesses. In the instant case the court was faced with a situa-
tion involving a public employee and it was held that striking a
prison guard who was trying to discipline a prisoner is not public
intimidation. The court applied the maxim used in State v. Via-
tor that penal statutes must be strictly construed and cannot be
extended to cases not included within the clear import of their
language. Justice Hamlin, writing the majority opinion, stressed
the fact that in the instant case the resentment of the defendant
displayed itself in a spontaneous act of mild violence and nothing
more. There was no showing that the force employed was for the
purpose of influencing the conduct of the officer in relation to
his position, employment, or duty in the sense that these words
are employed in the statute. According to the court, to punish
the defendant for public intimidation in this case would be tanta-
mount to "extending the application of a state law to a case and
circumstances not intended by the lawmakers. '22 According to
the maxim of strict construction of penal statutes, doubtful cases
are to be resolved in favor of the accused. This doctrine of strict
construction was not mentioned in the subsequent case of State
v. Miller,2 where the defendant was indicted for aggravated rape
but was convicted of simple rape. Defendant's contention, that
there was no evidence in the record to support the verdict of sim-
ple rape, was based on the argument that the simple rape article
did not cover cases where the victim's acquiescence was obtained
by force or threats of force. He contended that the article cov-
ered only consent obtained by a narcotic or anesthetic agent, or
by intoxication, or unsoundness of the mind. In affirming the
conviction the Louisiana Supreme Court pointed out that under
the simple rape article the female may be incapable of resisting
or understanding "by reason of stupor or abnormal condition of
the mind from any cause." (Emphasis added.) 24 The victim had
testified that force was used and that she was afraid to the point
of hysteria. The court stated that a forcible attack by a rapist
22. State v. Daniels, 236 La. 998, 1026, 109 So.2d 896, 906 (1959) : "To extend
the statute to the present situation would be tantamount to allowing the state to
do what the law and jurisprudence reprobates, i.e., to punish defendant by extend-
ing the application of a state law to a case and circumstances not intended by the
lawmakers."
23. 237 La. 266, 111 So.2d 108 (1959).
24. LA. R.S. 14:43 (1950) : "Simple rape is a rape committed where the sexual
intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of the female because it is
committed under any one or more of the following circumstances:
"(1) Where she is incapable of resisting or understanding the nature of the
act, by reason of stupor or abnormal condition of the mind produced by an intoxi-
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may produce terror and abnormal condition of the mind and
therefore evidence of a forcible attack would support a verdict
of simple rape. The court did not talk about a strict or liberal
construction of statutes. However, a strict construction of the
statute may well have led to the conclusion that a forcible attack
was not included within the meaning of the words "from any
cause."
25
A determination that criminal statutes should be strictly con-
strued actually amounts to deciding to resolve doubts of interpre-
tation in favor of the defendant. In determining how to construe
a statute the court has a great deal of freedom; in fact Professor
Llewellyn states that "there are over 26 different describable
ways in which a court can handle a prior case or a rule of con-
struction. '26 Since there is always more than one available justi-
fiable approach, the court may select among the various maxims
of construction. It must try to "make sense as a whole out of our
law as a whole."' 27 The good sense of the situation, a simple con-
struction of the available language to achieve that sense, and a
look to the future effect determine the course of judicial decision.
After the basic decision is arrived at, "statutory construction is
a diplomatic tongue for maneuver. '12  When a court is convinced
that it is logical and socially desirable to convict for certain con-
duct, the canon of strict construction is not mentioned; but when
the court feels that it is not appropriate to include the case at
bar within a criminal statute, the rule of strict construction be-
comes an important tool in the judicial process.2 9 Thus in the
instant case the court excluded the striking of the prison guard
from the crime of public intimidation, urging the maxim of strict
construction to achieve a logical result. If the conduct in the in-
stant case were to be treated as public intimidation, any person
cating, narcotic, or anesthetic agent, administered by or with the privity of the
offender; or when she has such incapacity, by reason of a stupor or abnormal con-
dition from any cause; and the offender knew or should have known of her in-
capacity. .. ."
25. Under accepted rules of statutory construction the court could have reached
the opposite decision. The principle of ejusdem generis requires that general words
which follow a series of specific designations can only be construed to include
things of the same general nature as those specifically enumerated. If this prin-
ciple were applied in construing the words "any cause" in the simple rape article,
it could hardly be said that fear and terror are in the same general class as the
enumerated elements of stupor from intoxication or drugs, mistake induced by
fraud, or lack of understanding because of unsoundness of the mind. See Note on
State v. Miller, infra page 606.
26. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are 'To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950).
27. Id. at 401.
28. Id. at 398.
29. Id. at 395.
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who resisted a simple order or direction of a police officer would
become guilty of that offense. Such an all-embrasive interpreta-
tion would hardly conform to the spirit or purpose of the public
intimidation article. The Miller case held that the statute there
involved included the particular situation of destroying the vic-
tim's reasoning power by causing a condition of hysteria and
terror. It can be argued that the conduct of the defendant was
not at variance with the legislative definition of simple rape.
Simple rape, being a lesser degree of the crime of aggravated
rape, can well be construed as covering a case where the "ab-
normal condition of the mind" is from terror and hysteria not
quite sufficient to amount to complete prevention of resistance.
When this result is reached, however, the maxim of strict con-
struction of criminal statutes will be conspicuous by its absence.
Sam J. Friedman
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SIMPLE RAPE AS A RESPONSIVE VERDICT
UNDER AN INDICTMENT FOR AGGRAVATED RAPE
Defendant was indicted for aggravated rape' and convicted of
simple rape.2 The state's case consisted primarily of the alleged
victim's testimony that she submitted to the defendant because
he threatened to kill her if she refused. Defendant moved for a
new trial on the ground that there was not the "slightest scintilla
of evidence in the record' 8 to support the verdict of simple rape.4
This contention was based on the argument that evidence of force
and threats to secure consent does not meet the definition of sim-
ple rape. The trial judge overruled the motion. On appeal to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, held, affirmed. A female who is faced
by an attacker intending to ravish her forcibly is immediately
thrown into a state of fear and confusion which renders her
incapable of resisting or of understanding the act of intercourse.
Proof of aggravated rape by force necessarily constitutes proof
of the lesser crime of simple rape because simple rape requires
only that the victim's consent be vitiated by her incapacity from
1. LA. R.S. 14:42 (1950).
2. Id. 14:43. Simple rape was made responsive to a charge of aggravated rape
by La. Acts 1948, No. 161, § 1, which amended LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. art. 386
(1928). This article is now LA. R.S. 15:386 (1950).
3. State v. Miller, 237 La. 266, 274, 111 So.2d 108, 110 (1959).
4. A motion for a new trial is the only procedural vehicle available for presen-
tation of a claim that there has been a total lack of evidence to support an essen-
tial element of an offense. State v. LaBorde, 234 La. 28, 99 So.2d 11 (1958).
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